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Introduction
Revealed preference conditions offer simple, intuitive and direct means of assessing the empirical implications of a wide range of basic economic models. Indeed, when revealed preference conditions are checked it is often found that the models perform reasonably well 1 . But is this a triumph for Economics, or a warning that revealed preference conditions are so undemanding that almost anything goes? The contribution of this paper is to provide a systematic way in which we might, for the first time, be able to tell.
To illustrate the difficulty, consider the classical two-good consumer choice problem illustrated in Figure 1 . It shows two budget constraints where prices are p 1 = [3, 4] ′ and p 2 = [4, 3] ′ and budgets are x 1 = 10 and x 2 = 5. This environment is one in which there is a modest change in relative prices in conjunction with a large change in income. As a result, regardless of where a nonsatiated consumer's choices fall, revealed preference restrictions on their behaviour simply cannot be violated. As Varian (1982) puts it, "... lack of variation in the price data limits the power of these methods."
H. Varian, Econometrica, 1982, pp 966-7. 2 This issue is well known, and a number of ways of accounting for it have been suggested 3 . The problem is that existing approaches lack a sound theoretical grounding and this creates two difficulties. First, there is no basis for choosing among competing proposals all of which may be plausible. Second, it is unclear how existing methods, which generally rely on the geometric intuition of the weak axiom of revealed preference, might extend to other more complex restrictions in the broad revealed preference family 4 . In the next section, we develop a way to account for the ability (or lack thereof) of revealed preference methods to reject optimising behaviour. Our approach is based on a measure of predictive success proposed by Selten and Krischker (1983) and Selten (1991) in the context of experimental game theory. A key feature of the proposed measure is that it has transparent theoretical underpinnings. We show that a set of axioms, which capture some desirable attributes of such a measure, cardinally identify the proposed measure. Section 3 shows that this approach is not just theoretically based but is also useful; we show that reporting revealed preference results using our proposed methods is far more informative than the usual approach of simply reporting pass rates.
Predictive Success in Revealed Preference Tests
Revealed preference restrictions confine a consumer's observed choices to lie in a specific, welldefined set. To illustrate, consider Figure 2 , which shows a two-good, two-choice example where prices are p 1 = [3, 4] ′ p 2 = [4, 3] ′ and budgets are 10 in each period. If a consumer with concave, monotonic, continuous, non-satiated preferences were to make choices from these two budget sets then those choices must satisfy the Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). 5 of contributions which discuss the statistical power of revealed preference tests on stochastic variables including Varian (1985) , Epstein and Yatchew (1985) , Bronars (1987) , Famulari (1997) , Aizcorbe (2001) and Blundell et al (2008) who build on the work of Andrews and Guggenburger (2007) . In the future the Andrews and Guggenberger (2007) approach might be usefully combined with the methods developed here to deal with both the statistical and non-statistical aspects of rejectability in revealed preference tests. 3 See Andreoni and Harbaugh (2008) for a recent discussion of the issue, a review of the various measures which have been proposed, suggestions for a number of novel approaches and a comparative empirical study of the performance for all of the indices. 4 This includes revealed preference type approaches to profit maximisation and cost minimisation by perfectly competitive and monopolistic firms (Hanoch and Rothschild, 1972) ; the strong rational expectations hypothesis (Browning, 1989) ; expected utility theory (Bar-Shiva, 1992); household sharing models (Cherchye, De Rock and Vermuelen, 2007); firm investment behaviour (Varian, 1983) ; characteristics models (Blow et al, 2008) ; habits (Crawford, 2009) , and so on. 5 Afriat (1967) , Diewert (1972) , Varian (1982) . 
The area of the GARP restrictions in Figure 2 .
A simple two-dimensional way of representing the restrictions on choices implied by GARP is to illustrate the set of GARP-consistent budget shares for one of the goods (w 1,t denotes the budget share of good 1 on budget constraint t) in a unit square -where the budget share of the other good is implied by adding up. This is illustrated in Figure 3 , where the shaded area S shows the set of all budget shares for good 1 which are consistent with GARP 6 and the unit square P is the set of all possible budget-shares for this good. When we check GARP on observed choices, we are essentially looking to see if the observed shares lie in the predicted set. A useful analogy is that the set of demands admissible under the theory defines a target for the choice data and we then check to see if the consumer's choices have hit the target. Now reconsider the nature of revealed preference restrictions in the price-budget environment depicted in Figure 1 . If we plotted the revealed preference-consistent budget shares for those budget constraints, the whole of the unit square corresponding to Figure 3 would be shaded. In that case, the set of outcomes predicted by the theory is also the set of all possible outcomes; the theory rules nothing out and as a result it is impossible for observed choices to reject the restrictions.
Figures 1, 2 and 3 are instructive. They suggest that merely recording the pass rate of revealed preference tests in a consumer panel survey may not, on its own, be a very good guide as to the success or otherwise of the model. To the extent that the constraints imposed by the revealed preference restrictions may represent "unmissable targets", the simple pass rate may be entirely uninformative about the performance of the model. It would seem to be important to find a way of accounting for this. Figure 3 suggests a possible solution. The size of the set defined by the revealed preference restrictions (S) relative to the size of the set of all possible outcomes (P ) is a natural measure of the discipline imposed by the restrictions. In Figure 2 , the relative size of the predicted set as a proportion of the outcome space is 40/49 ≈ 81.6%. In this case, 19.4% of possible outcomes are ruled out by the revealed preference restrictions -it is at least possible to miss the target. It therefore seems that we should take the size of the target area as well as the pass/fail indicator into account when evaluating the outcome of a revealed preference test: a model should be counted as more successful in situations in which we observe both good pass rates and demanding restrictions.
In what follows we denote the pass/fail indicator by r ∈ {0, 1} and the relative area of the target a ∈ [0, 1] (i.e. the size of S relative to P where the relative area of the empty set 0 and the relative area of the whole outcome space is 1). If the measure of success -which we denote m (r, a) -should depend on both pass rate and area, the question of the functional form of m (r, a) remains open. To address this, we begin by asking what properties should such a measure have? Consider the following:
Monotonicity says that a model for which the data satisfy extremely demanding (point) restrictions should be judged as more successful than one in which the data fails to satisfy entirely undemanding restrictions. The idea of Equivalence is that a situation in which there are no restrictions and a situation in which nothing is ruled out are equally (un)informative about the performance of a model. Aggregability says that it is desirable that the measure should be additively decomposable when it is applied to heterogeneous consumers so that it is relatively straightfoward to calculate an overall average performance measure for a sample of data and to make inferences about the expected value of m in the population. Given these axioms, we have the following result:
Selten's Theorem. The function, m = r−a satisfies monotonicity, equivalence and aggregability. If m (r, a) also satisfies these axioms then there exist real numbers {β, γ > 0} such that m (r, a) = β + γm.
Proof: See Appendix. 7 Selten's Theorem says that not only does the simple difference measure of pass rate minus area satisfy these axioms, but all measures which satisfy these axioms are positive linear transformations of this difference. The implication is that we might as well use the simple difference 8 . The resulting measure m ∈ [−1, 1] can be viewed as a pass/fail indicator, corrected for the ability to find rejections. The interpretation of m is very straightforward. As m approaches one we know that we have a situation in which the restrictions are extremely demanding, coupled with data which satisfy them: the sign of a quantitatively successful model. As m approaches minus one we know that we have restrictions which allow almost any observed behaviour and yet the data fail to conform: the sign of an almost pathologically unsuccessful model. As m approaches zero we know we have a situation in which the apparent accuracy of the data simply mirrors the size of the target.
To conclude this section we propose a generalisation of the ideas discussed above. Revealed preference methods (somewhat notoriously) give rather hit/miss results; the outcome for an individual consumer is r = 1 if they pass and r = 0 if they fail. Even though this has the benefit of clarity it might be argued that it comes at the expense of recognising a qualitative difference between near misses and data that are way off target. A simple way in which to generalise the binary pass/fail result is to compute the Euclidean distance (d) between the observed data and the target area and use this in place of r. Unfortunately, such a measure is unsuitable for several reasons 9 . A better alternative is to measure the extent of the miss proportionally to the maximum possible distance (denoted d max ) between a feasible outcome and the target area (this would be at (0, 1) in Figure  3 , for example). The new hit rate r d = 1 − d/d max lies in the interval zero-one and takes the value one if the data satisfy the revealed preference restrictions, and zero if it misses by the maximum possible amount. This way of measuring hits and misses smooths out a binary result by penalising close shaves and wild misses differently and, since it lies in the unit interval, the overall measure of predictive success m d = r d − a continues to satisfy Selten's Theorem.
Connections with the literature
The relative area is not a probability measure. Nevertheless, it does have all of the necessary properties of a probability (it is nonnegative, the relative area of the whole outcome space is one and the total area of two disjoint subsets of the outcome space is the sum of the areas). If one were to interpret the relative area as a probability then an interpretation of m ≈ 0 is that the theory performs about as well as a uniform random number generator. This interpretation provides a link between the measure proposed above and the investigation of statistical power conducted by Bronars (1987) . Statistical power is, of course a measure of P rob (Rejecting H 0 | H 0 is false) but the calculation of any statistical power measure requires an alternative hypothesis to be specified. Bronars' (1987) adopts Becker's (1962) idea of uniform random choices over the outcome space as a general alternative hypothesis to a null of optimising behaviour. The implication is that area may be interpreted as one minus Bronars' (1987) statistical power measure.
The original intent of the ideas developed by Selten (1991) was to find a way of measuring predictive success in experimental game theory. Likewise the area can be thought of as a tool to aim the better design of experiments. For example, in the context of a lab experiment designed to test revealed preference conditions (e.g. Sippel (1997) and Harbaugh, Krause, and Berry (2001)) the area can be used to optimise the design of the experiment by choosing the price-budget environment to minimise the relative area and thus maximise the sensitivity of the test to non-rational behaviour. More recently Blundell et al (2003) consider the design of revealed preference tests in the context of observational data when the investigator observes prices and Engel curves. The Engel curves allow the investigator to construct budget expansion paths for demands at the observed prices and Blundell et al (2003) consider the question of how to choose the budget levels at which to evaluate demands and conduct revealed preference tests with the object of maximising the sensitivity of the test. Their solution -the sequential maximum power path -takes an initial price-quantity observation and then sequentially sets the budget for the next choice such that the original choice is exactly affordable and no more. In this way they seek sequentially to optimise the test conditional on observed behaviour up to that point. Whilst the approach taken in Blundell et al (2003) is quite different in spirit to that taken in this paper, it turns out that it is easy to show in a simple two-good example their method can be interpreted as minimising the relative area conditional on the sequential ordering of the path that they choose. This connection also suggests how the ideas developed here could be used to improve their method further by considering alternative orderings of the data aimed at minimising the area unconditionally.
An Illustrative Application
We now turn to a practical application of these ideas. We begin by showing how the proposed measure is useful in interpreting a revealed preference analysis of a heterogeneous sample. We then show how using the smoothed hit rate provides information on the nature of the failures of the theory. Finally, we show how our approach can be used to compare alternative models.
We use data from the Spanish Continuous Family Expenditure Survey (the Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Familiares -ECPF). The ECPF is a quarterly budget survey of Spanish households, which interviews about 3,200 households every quarter. Households are randomly rotated at a rate of 12.5% per quarter. It is possible to follow a participating household for up to eight consecutive periods. The data cover the years 1985 to 1997 and the selected sub-sample are couples with and without children, in which the husband is in full-time employment in a non-agricultural activity and the wife is out of the labour force (this is to minimise the effects of nonseparabilities between consumption demands and leisure for which the empirical application does not otherwise allow). The dataset consists of 21,866 observations on 3,134 households. It records household non-durable expenditures aggregated into 5 broad commodity groups ("Food, Alcohol and Tobacco","Energy and Services at Home","Non Durables","Travel" and "Personal Services"). The price data are national price indices for the corresponding expenditure categories.
Predictive Success in a Consumer Panel
We independently check GARP and calculate the area for each household in our data. The aggregate pass rate for GARP is impressively high, r = 0.957. The vast majority of households in the data pass; we can conclude that they behave in a manner consistent with the canonical economic model. However, given the preceding discussion, we are compelled to ask the question, how demanding was the test? We find that the aggregate area is a = 0.912. This leads to an aggregate measure of predictive success of m = 0.045. The implication is that the standard economic model of utility maximisation out-performed a random number generator -but only by 4.5%. Given this, the unadjusted pass rate of 95.7% seems a great deal less impressive and even somewhat misleading regarding the success of the model. Figure 4 plots the frequency distribution of the household-level areas and Figure 5 plots the distribution of the household-level measures of predictive success. A key feature of the results highlighted in Figure 4 is that for many households the relative area of the target is equal to 1 -the theory cannot fail. As a consequence, as illustrated in Figure 5 , for most of our sample the model has a measure of predictive success equal to zero because the households' observed choices have simply succeeded in hitting an unmissable target. Figure 5 also shows that while the restrictions of the model provide a modicum of discipline for some households, there are also a small number of households in the left tail who have missed relatively large target areas. The distribution of the individual pass/fail measures r i (not illustrated) simply has two mass points: f r (0) = 0.043 and f r (1) = 0.957.
We now generalise the measure of predictive success to distinguish between a near miss and a wild miss. Figure 6 shows the distribution of the modified pass/fail measure for the 133 household in our sample that miss the theoretical target. The distribution is skewed somewhat to the left of its theoretical zero-one range indicating that most households who fail GARP do so by less than half the extent to which they might, but in general the distances would be hard to describe as being massed close to zero. We might conclude that, in these data, consumers who violate GARP do not do so narrowly. Since this calculation only applies to 4.3% of our data (the percentage that failed) the effect of the generalised pass/fail measure on the aggregate performance index is modest: we find that r d = 0.97 compared to r = 0.957 and the measure of predicted success is equal to m d = 0.058 compared to m = 0.045. Overall we can conclude that, for most of these households, those who satisfy the theory do so because the GARP restrictions are almost completely without bite. Whilst those who fail, do not do so narrowly. Of course, we are not claiming that these particular results apply more widely than the dataset studied here. But we are claiming that presenting results in this way sheds a great deal more light on the success, or otherwise, of economic theory than does the uncorrected aggregate pass rate which is uniformly reported in the applied literature.
Model Comparison
We now turn to the issue of model comparison and consider two extensions of the basic model of consumer choice and ask whether m might provide useful guidance in each case. These are: utility maximisation with optimisation error and utility maximisation with measurement error.
Optimisation Errors
A modification of the revealed preference conditions was developed by Afriat (1967 Afriat ( , 1972 and Varian (1985 Varian ( , 1990 to allow for optimisation errors. This modification introduces a free parameter into the restrictions called the Afriat efficiency parameter (denoted by e), which lies in the interval zero-one. 10 One minus the Afriat efficiency parameter can be interpreted as the proportion of the household's budget that they are allowed to waste through optimisation errors. Fixing the Afriat efficiency at one requires perfect cost efficiency and is equivalent to a standard GARP test. Setting it equal to zero allows complete inefficiency in which case all feasible demand data are consistent with the theory. Values in between one and zero weaken the revealed preference restrictions monotonically.
The Afriat efficiency approach is simple to apply and widely used. However, the difficulty facing researchers is determining the appropriate level for e. 11 We know that if we set the efficiency parameter low enough, we can always get the data to pass and, in fact, lowering the efficiency parameter just enough to get the data to pass is exactly what is done in much of the literature. 12 But given the preceding discussion, we also know that simply maximising the pass rate is not the right thing to do if it also increases the area, which is precisely what lowering the Afriat efficiency does. The optimal choice of the efficiency parameter must depend on the balance between pass rate and area. To investigate the issue we vary the Afriat efficiency and track the predictive performance of the modified GARP conditions in our data. This is shown in Figure 7 , which clearly illustrates the effects of the Afriat efficiency index on the performance of the model. Whilst setting the required efficiency to 95% sounds fairly demanding and indeed is sufficient to guarantee that everyone will pass, in fact doing so enlarges the target area so as to be unmissable. The optimal level for efficiency is much higher (99.5%) although it should be noted that even this only raises the performance of the model to a little over 5%.
Measurement Errors
As discussed above, the data are composed of expenditures by households on commodity groups collected in the ECPF, and corresponding national price indices published by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística. Since the expenditures are recorded in the survey, but the prices are national time series data, is seems highly possible that, if there is measurement error, most of it will be found in the price data. To this end, we consider an extension of the basic model discussed in Varian (1985) which allows for classical, mean zero, measurement errors in log prices. 13 The error variance (which for illustrative purposes we assume is common across commodity groups) is of course unknown, so once again it represents a free parameter in the model.
The effects of increasing the error variance, unlike those of the Afriat efficiency parameter in the previous example or the case of attenuation bias in statistical tests, can go either way: households which previously passed (failed) may now fail (pass) once measurement error is allowed for, and the effects on the area could also go in either direction. To analyse the effects on the predictive performance of the theory we simulate the measurement error by drawing from a multivariate N (0, σ) and compute the expected value of m for different values of σ. Figure 8 shows the relationship between the standard deviation of the measurement error and the expected performance of the modified theory. With σ = 0 we have no measurement error and so we have m = 0.045 as before. As we gradually increase the measurement error we see that the performance of the augmented model improves. This is mainly due to the fact that even though pass rates are dropping over the early part of this range, the area is falling faster as the increased variance of the prices makes budget lines cross to a greater extent. However it is not the case, in this context, that enough measurement allows you to rationalise anything; indeed there is clear evidence that with σ 0.35 that the predictive performance of the model begins to fall. It would appear that a model of optimising behaviour subject to N (0, 0.35) measurement error in log prices provides the most satisfactory of those considered for these data.
Conclusions
This paper solves two long-standing problems in the revealed preference literature. First, it provides a simple and intuitive approach to accounting for the fact that, sometimes, revealed preference tests just cannot miss. Second, it can be applied to all of the members of the broad family of revealed preference type methods for which an outcome space can be defined. Whilst we would not defend to the death the particular axioms used in this paper, we would argue that the general axiomatic approach based on pass rates and relative area is the right way to make progress on this issue. If these axioms seem unpalatable then investigators are free to choose others, more to their liking, which may identify another functional form for m (r, a).
Our empirical example demonstrates the potential importance of making these allowances when interpreting the results of revealed preference analyses. In our examination of optimising behaviour, we obtain an unadjusted pass rate of 95.7%. At first glance, this seems like a notable validation of a fundamental economic model. But when we account for the quite undemanding nature of the restrictions which theory places on these data, we see that the performance of the model is far less impressive. Put a different way, in our sample, the economic model is revealed to perform about 4.5% better than a random number generator. This should reverse our conclusions about the strength of the empirical support for the model. The framework proposed above also allows for a far richer description of the results of a revealed preference analysis. Generalising the pass rate to distinguish between near misses and wild misses tells us that, at least for our sample, households that fail do not do so narrowly. The approach is also useful as a guide to model adjustment/selection: our example illustrates how these methods can be used to select an optimal cost efficiency parameter or measurement error variance. We conclude that the methods developed in this paper provide a more revealing look at revealed preference.
